Mercer Law Review
Volume 44
Number 2 Leads Edition - Making a Case for
Constitutional Entitlements

Article 13

3-1993

Edge v. State: The Modified Merger Rule Comes Up Short
Mark Kenneth Delegal

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Mark Kenneth Delegal, Edge v. State: The Modified Merger Rule Comes Up Short, 44 Mercer L. Rev. 697
(1993).

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Edge v. State: The Modified Merger Rule
Comes Up Short
I.

INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL STATEMENT

In Edge v. State,' the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a verdict
convicting a defendant of voluntary manslaughter and felony murder
based in the underlying felony of aggravated assault was improper.2 The
court reasoned that because the jury found Edge guilty of voluntary manslaughter, malice did not exist and therefore, could not be transferred to
support a felony murder conviction. Regrettably, the supreme court failed
to adopt the merger rule. However, the court adopted a modified merger
rule that precludes a conviction for felony murder when a conviction
would prevent the jury from an otherwise proper finding of voluntary
manslaughter.8
On Friday night, July 6, 1990 at 9:24 p.m., a dispatcher with the Perry
Police Department in Perry, Georgia received a call from Edge." Edge had
shot and killed his estranged wife with a pistol.5 A grand jury in Houston
County, Georgia indicted Edge for murder with malice aforethought, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a crime. s During the trial and prior to charging
the jury, Edge's attorney objected and asked that the trial court not give
both a charge on felony murder and murder with malice aforethought because it would cause confusion in the minds of the jury.7 However, the
trial judge overruled the objection and proceeded to instruct the jury on
malice murder, felony murder, and their lesser included offenses. 8 The
1. 261 Ga. 865, 414 S.E.2d 463 (1992).
2. 261 Ga. at 865, 414 S.E.2d at 464.
3. Id. at 866-87, 414 S.E.2d at 465. Voluntary manslaughter is a proper finding when
defendant committed the acts "solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation." O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2 (1992).
4. Trial Transcript at 45, Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865, 414 S.E.2d 463 (1992) (No. 90-C16239-N).
5. 261 Ga. at 865, 414 S.E.2d at 464.
6. Indictment, Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865, 414 S.E.2d 463 (1992) (No. 90-C-16239-N).
7. Trial Transcript at 495.
8. Trial Transcript at 458-89. Specifically, regarding malice murder, the judge charged
the jury as follows:
I charge you that a person commits murder when he unlawfully and with malice
aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of another human being.
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jury found Edge guilty of voluntary manslaughter, felony murder, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.' The trial judge
denied defendant's motion for new trial. 10 The judge sentenced Edge to
imprisonment for life and to a term of years. 1 Edge appealed the convictions of both felony murder and voluntary manslaughter by filing his notice of appeal on April 24, 1991.12
II. THE COURT'S REASONING: STUBBORN RELUCTANCE TO CHANGE
In Edge the supreme court concluded that a jury could not consistently
render a verdict for voluntary manslaughter and felony murder based on
the same underlying aggravated assault." By finding Edge guilty of voluntary manslaughter, the jury necessarily found that the malice of the
underlying felony of aggravated assault was mitigated by provocation."

Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of another human being, which is shown by external circumstances capable of proof.
Malice may be implied where no considerable provocation appears, and where all
the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.
Trial Transcript at 471-72. The judge gave the jury the following charge relating to felony
murder:
A person also commits the crime of murder when in the commission of a felony he
causes the death of another human being irrespective of malice. Under our law,
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is a felony and is defined as follows: an
assault is an attempt to commit a violent injury to the person of another or an act
which places another person in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving
a violent
injury.
Trial Transcript at 472-74. Finally, the court gave the following charge regarding voluntary
manslaughter:
I charge you as follows. A person commits voluntary manslaughter when he causes
the death of another human being, under circumstances which would otherwise be
murder, if he acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent and irresistible passion,
resulting from serious provocation, sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable
person.
Trial Transcript at 474.
9. 261 Ga. at 865, 414 S.E.2d at 464. Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of malice murder. Voluntary manslaughter, unlike malice murder, does not involve
malice aforethought. ROBERT E. CLEARY, JR., KURTZ, CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND DEFENSES 246
(3rd ed. 1991).
10. 261 Ga. at 865 n.1, 414 S.E.2d at 464 n.1.
11. Id. at 865, 414 S.E.2d at 464. See Final Disposition, Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865, 414
S.E.2d 463 (1992) (No. 90-C-16239-N) (Count 1, Voluntary Manslaughter, twenty years;
Count 2, Felony Murder, Life in Prison; and Count 3, Possession of a Firearm During the
Commission of a Crime, five years consecutive to Count 2).
12. 261 Ga. at 865 n.1, 414 S.E.2d at 464 n.1.
13. Id. at 865, 414 S.E.2d at 463.
14. Id. at 865-66, 414 S.E.2d at 464-65.

MODIFIED MERGER RULE
The court initially reaffirmed its holding in Malone v. State." In Malone the court recognized that in proper circumstances, a jury charge on
both felony murder predicated upon aggravated assault and voluntary
manslaughter was appropriate." In Edge the court reasoned that to support a conviction for felony murder, the jury must impute the mens rea of
the underlying felony to the murder.17 The supreme court found that the
jury made a specific determination that Edge acted with sufficient provocation to warrant a verdict of voluntary manslaughter; and therefore, the
jury could not at the same time decide that Edge had a different and
higher mental state necessary, for conviction of felony murder.18 The supreme court recognized that a jury could find a defendant guilty of felony
murder predicated on the felony of aggravated assault committed with
malice."9 The court concluded that once the jury convicted defendant of
voluntary manslaughter, the same felonious assault could not underlie 20a
conviction for felony murder because there was no malice to impute.
The court adopted Edge's contention that the trial court erred in entering
judgment against him for voluntary manslaughter and felony murder
predicated upon the same assault.2
A.

Merger Rule

In reaching its decision, the court considered the merger rule; a rule
inextricably intertwined with the felony murder rule. The merger rule
prohibits the use of a felonious assault as the basis for felony murder.2
Many states reject the use of a felonious assault to support a felony murder conviction, and instead require felonies that are independent from
the homicidal act.28 However, in Georgia, prior to the
decision in Edge,
24
any felony could support a felony murder conviction.
In an effort to remain consistent with previous decisions, the supreme
court in Edge rejected the adoption of the merger rule.' Instead, the
court adopted a modified merger rule.2 6 "[Tihe modified version adopted
by this opinion precludes a felony murder conviction only where it would
15.

238 Ga. 251, 232 S.E.2d 907 (1977).

16. Id. at 252, 232 S.E.2d at 908.
17. 261 Ga. at 865-66, 414 S.E.2d at 464-65.
18. Id. at 866, 414 S.E.2d at 465.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21.

Id. at 865, 414 S.E.2d at 464.

22. Id. at 866, 414 S.E.2d 465.
23. ROBERT B. CLEARY, JR., KURTZ,
24.
25.
26.

CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND DEFENSES

CLEARY, supra note 23, at 251.

261 Ga. at 866, 414 S.E.2d at 465.
Id. at 867, 414 S.E.2d at 465.

252 (3rd ed. 1991).
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prevent an otherwise warranted verdict of voluntary manslaughter.' 27 A
voluntary manslaughter verdict is improper when the jury finds that
provocation mitigated the homicide.28 Therefore, when the killing is mitigated by provocation sufficient to find voluntary manslaughter, a conviction for felony murder cannot stand.,
The court relied on its prior decisions in Lewis v. State 9 and Baker v.
State30 in refusing to completely accept the merger rule." If a court does
not adopt the merger doctrine, it must bootstrap the malice present in
the underlying aggravated assault to support a felony murder
conviction.2

Instead of adopting the merger rule in total, the supreme court adopted
a modified version of the merger rule."3 The court considered the policy
reasons behind the "strict liability" felony murder rule as a means of explaining its adoption of a modified merger rule.' 4 The court noted:
The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings
they commit. [Cit] The Legislature has said in effect that this deterrent
purpose outweighs the normal legislative policy of examining the individual state of mind of each person causing an unlawful killing to determine
whether the killing was with or without malice, deliberate or accidental,
and calibrating our treatment of the person accordingly. Once a person
perpetrates or attempts to perpetrate one of the enumerated felonies,
then in the judgment of the Legislature, he is no longer entitled to such
fine judicial calibration, but will be deemed guilty of first degree murder
for any homicide committed in the course thereof."
The purpose behind the rule is important to the decision in Edge because
the supreme court, in effect, balances the purposes of the felony murder
rule against the requirement of mens rea, and adopts the modified merger
rule as a compromise.1
27. Id.
28. Id. at 866, 414 S.E.2d at 465.
29. 260 Ga. 404, 405 n.2, 396 S.E.2d 212, 213 n.2 (1990).
30. 236 Ga. 754, 757, 225 S.E.2d 269, 271 (1976).
31. 261 Ga. at 866, 414 S.E.2d at 465.
32. Id. Improper bootstrapping takes place when a jury is permitted to find a defendant
guilty of felony murder by first finding that defendant acted with malice, and then finding
that a homicide occurred during the commission of the felony. People v. Ireland, 450 P.2d
580, 589-90 (Cal. 1969).
33. 261 Ga. at 867, 414 S.E.2d at 465.
34. Id. at 866-67, 414 S.E.2d at 465.
35. 261 Ga. at 866-67, 414 S.E.2d at 465 (quoting People v. Burton, 491 P.2d 793, 801-02
(Cal. 1971)).
36. . 261 Ga. at 866-67, 414 S.E.2d at 465.
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The court, recognizing that the holding in Edge requires precision, established guidelines to help trial courts in charging the jury. 7 An instruction preventing the jury from deliberating on voluntary manslaughter incorrectly precludes consideration of provocation and/or passion.3s The
supreme court now requires the trial court to instruct the jury in a manner that ensures consideration of both voluntary manslaughter and felony
murder instead of considering felony murder in isolation. 9 Here, the
court concluded that since the jury found Edge guilty of voluntary manslaughter, it must have found that Edge fired the shots with provocation
and passion and not with malice imputable 40to murder; and as such, the
jury wrongfully convicted of felony murder.

III.

ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION

We must consider the felony murder doctrine, the merger rule, and the
applicable Georgia law in order to bring clarity and understanding to the
opinion.
A. Felony Murder Doctrine
Georgia codifies its murder and felony murder doctrine at Official Code
of Georgia ("O.C.G.A.") section 16-5-1." 1 Under the felony murder doctrine, the mens rea present during the commission of the underlying felony serves as a basis for mens rea of malice in murder.2 "The felony
murder rule imputes the actor's culpable mental state in committing a
felony to any homicide that occurs in furtherance of or during the com37. 261 Ga. at 867, 414 S.E.2d at 465-66. "A sequential charge requiring the jury to consider voluntary manslaughter only if it has considered and found the defendant not guilty of
malice murder and felony murder is not appropriate where there is evidence that would
authorize a charge on voluntary manslaughter." Id. at 867, 414 S.E.2d at 466.
38. Id. at 867, 414 S.E.2d at 465-66.

39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id. at 868, 414 S.E.2d at 466.
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 (1992). Georgia's murder and felony murder statute provides:
(a) A person commits the offense of murder when he unlawfully and with malice
aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of another human being.
(b) Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take the life of an-

other human being which is manifested by external circumstances capable of
proof. Malice shall be implied where no considerable provocation appears and
where all the circumstances of the killing show an abandozied and malignant
heart. (c)A person also commits the offense of murder when, in the commission of
the felony, he causes the death of another human being irrespective of malice.
42.

CLEARY,

supra note 23, at 251.
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mission of the felony.' 43 In Georgia, the malice requirement for felony
murder can be imputed or substituted from any felony." In Edge v.
State," the jury improperly imputed the malice necessary to the commission of aggravated assault to convict Edge of felony murder."
Historically, the felony murder rule was logical because all felonies were
capital, and therefore punishable by death. 47 The application of the rule
was unlikely to result in an injustice because the same outcome resulted
regardless of the conviction-death." The English common law rule of
felony murder provided that a person who caused the death of another
during the commission of a felony was guilty of murder without concern
for the underlying felony or its danger.' 9 The initial felony murder rule in
England provided that: "Homicide resulting from any felony committed
in a dangerous way, is murder."50 However, in England, there had been a
continued decline in use of the felony murder rule, resulting in its abolishment in 1957.51
In the United States, the felony murder rule is alive and well in nearly
every state,52 though not without its detractors-'5 Substantial policies support the felony murder doctrine." The predominate purpose advanced is
that the felony murder rule deters felons from negligently endangering
the lives of others during the commission of a felony by holding them
responsible for the resulting deaths. 5' The felony murder doctrine meets
community and law enforcement goals by reflecting society's attitude that
a death resulting during commission of a felony is more serious than a
felony without a death; and that the felon deserves "just deserts." 6 Simi43. Barry Bendetowies, Note, Felony Murder and Child Abuse: A Proposalfor the New

York Legislature, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 383, 387 (1990-91).
44. CLEARY, supra note 23, at 251.
45. 261 Ga. 865, 414 S.E.2d 463.

46. Id.at 865-66, 414 S.E.2d at 464-65.
47.

ROLLIN

M.

PERKINS

& RONALD N.

BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW

136 (1982).

48. Id.
49. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT,
(1986).
50. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 47, at 63.

JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW

§ 7.5(a)

51. Id. at 64.
52. Gail W. Stewart, Note, The Felony Murder In Texas: The Merger Problem, 33 BAYL. REV. 1035, 1035 (1981).

LOR

53. CLEARY, supra note 23, at 251.
54. David Crump & Susan W. Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 359, 361 (1985).
55. Id. at 369-71.
56. Id. at 363. "Just dessert" refers to the classification and grading of criminal acts so
that the punishment of the crime squares with society's view of what is proper. Id. at 362-
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larly, the felony murder rule serves both to condemn strongly the killing

and to reaffirm society's value of human life.57
The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the purpose of the "strict lia-

bility" felony murder rule is to relieve the state of the burden of proving
premeditation and malice when a death occurs during the commission of
a felony.5' In Edge the supreme court determined that the purpose of the
"strict liability" rule is to deter negligent and accidental killing during
the commission of a felony by holding the felon responsible for resulting
deaths."
In Edge the court relied on Baker v. State0 in which the supreme court
recognized two often cited areas of criticism of the felony murder doctrine. First, without limiting the felonies that can underlie felony murder,
any felony, including a non-dangerous felony can serve as a basis to impute malice. 1 Second, death becomes murder when malice of the initial
act of aggression, like aggravated assault, is imputed to allow the felony
murder.62 In Baker, the court asserted that despite these reasons, the

court was not free to adopt the solution-the merger rule-because the
Georgia legislature intended felony murder to include all felonies.6
B.

The Merger Rule

To the contrary, because of the broad language of O.C.G.A. section 165-1, which does not restrict felonies that can support a felony murder

57. Id. at 367.
58. Lewis v. State, 260 Ga. 404, 405 n.2, 396 S.E.2d 212, 213 n.2 (1990).
59. 261 Ga. at 866-67, 414 S.E.2d at 465.
60. 236 Ga. 754, 225 S.E.2d 269 (1976).
61. Id. at 755, 225 S.E.2d at 270. The Supreme Court of Georgia indicated in Young v.
State, 238 Ga. 548, 233 S.E.2d 750 (1977) that the felony of escape, in Davis v. State, 234
Ga. 730, 218 S.E.2d 20 (1975) that the felony of cruelty to children, and in Lindsey v. State,
227 Ga. 48, 178 S.E.2d 848 (1970) that the felony of conspiracy could underlie a felony
murder conviction.
62. 236 Ga. at 755, 225 S.E.2d at 270.
63. 236 Ga. at 757-58, 255 S.E.2d at 271-72. In Baker, the court said that based on the
narrow definition of voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter, it was unable to
adopt the merger doctrine in toto because to do so would allow certain homicides to go
unpunished. Specifically, the court stated that[Vjoluntary manslaughter encompasses only those killings done in "sudden, violent, and irresistible passion." Involuntary manslaughter'covers deaths in the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner, and deaths caused in the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony. Therefore, no death caused by a
felony can possibly fall within either branch of involuntary manslaughter, and it
can fall under voluntary manslaughter only if done in passion.
Id. at 757, 225 S.E.2d at 271-72 (citations omitted).
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conviction, it is only the courts that can limit the application of the fel6
ony murder rule. 4
The reasoning in Baker has been criticized for
overlook[ing] the fact that malice can be implied if the killing exhibits an
abandoned and malignant heart. It is submitted that extremely negligent
behavior during a forcible felony would qualify under this rubric for a
malice murder conviction. In fact, a persuasive argument could be made
that virtually any crime when committed through the use of a weapon
capable of killing illustrated an "abandoned and malignant heart.",
Hence, the reasons provided in Baker, and adopted in Edge, are insufficient for failing to adopt the merger rule. The deaths committed during
an aggravated assault, for example, are not accidental because the assaulter clearly intends to cause serious injury."0
In the United States, the trend is to limit the underlying felonies upon
which felony murder can be predicated to those felonies that are inherently dangerous.0 7 However, in Georgia no limitation exists on the types
of felonies that trigger the felony murder rule. 6" O.C.G.A. section 16-5-1
allows any felony to underlie a felony murder."
The merger rule serves to limit the application of the felony murder
rule.'0 The merger rule refers to the process whereby the law considers an
underlying felonious aggravated assault as part of a single transaction
causing the homicide, and therefore, it requires the underlying assault to
merge into the homicide and be "analyzed for the presence or absence of
malice.""7
The court in Edge refused to adopt the merger rule in toto.72 However,
a strong argument can be made for its complete adoption. In People v.
Ireland,'3 a case cited in Edge,7" the Supreme Court of California con64. CLEARY, supra note 24, at 251; See also Note, Felony Murder in Georgia: A Lethal
Anachronism?, 9 GA. ST. BJ. 462 (1973).
65. CLEARY, supra note 24, at 252.
66. Id.
67. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 48,'at 65. Inherently dangerous has been interpreted in
two different ways. One, whether under the circumstances, a foreseeable danger to human
life existed. Two, the peril to human life must be determined from the elements of the
felony in the abstract. 2 LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 50, § 7.5(b).
68. CLEARY, supra note 23, at 251.
69. 2 LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 50, § 7.5(b).
70. Stewart, supra note 52, at 1036.
71. 236 Ga. at 755-56, 225 S.E.2d at 269-71.
72. 261 Ga. at 867, 414 S.E.2d at 465.
73. 450 P.2d 580 (Cal. 1969).
74. 261 Ga. at 866-67, 414 S.E.2d at 465.
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cluded that the felonious assault could not be used as the underlying felony for felony murder. 7 ' The court stated:

To allow such use of the felony-murder rule would effectively preclude
the jury from considering the issue of malice aforethought in all cases
wherein homicide has been committed as a result of a felonious assault-a category which includes the great majority of all homicides.
This kind of bootstrapping finds support neither in logic nor in law. We
therefore hold that a second degree felony-murder instruction may not
properly be given when it is based upon a felony which is an integral part
of the homicide and which the evidence produced by the prosecution
shows to be an offense included in fact within the offense charged.' 6
The felony murder rule allows the prosecution to obtain a murder conviction simply by proving the intent to injure.7 However, under Ireland, if
the felonious act is an integral part of the homicide, jury instructions cannot be given that absolve the jury from having to find malice
aforethought. 8
The punishing-accidental-deaths rationale, adopted in Baker," is not a
meritorious reason for allowing aggravated assaults to underlie felony
murder and for failing to adopt the merger rule.s0 As stated in Edge, the
purpose of the felony murder rule is to deter negligent and accidental
killings during the commission of a felony. 1 The overwhelming majority
of deaths that occur during the commission of a felony do not result from
accident or mistake. s2 Aggravated assaults are not accidental deaths. 88 In
all cases of aggravated assault, the acts of the defendants are done with
the intent to cause great harm to another human being. 4 To obtain a
murder conviction, the jury should be required to find an intent to kill
(malice) before rendering a verdict for murder.88 Both the accidental reasoning and the deterrence rational are erroneous.86
75.
76.:
77.
78.
79.

450 P.2d at 590.
Id.
Bendetowies, supra note 43, at 393.
450 P.2d at 590.
236 Ga. at 757-58, 225 S.E.2d at 271-272.
80. CLEARY, supra note 23, at 252.
81. 261 Ga. at 866-67, 414 S.E.2d at 465.
82. CLEARY, supra note 23, at 252.

83. Id.
84, Id.
85.
86.

Id.
Crump & Crump, supra note 54, at 378. "The merger of assaultive offenses, which

makes little sense in terms of deterrence, thus can be rationalized if one recognizes that
proportionality is an important principle underlying the felony murder rule." Id. at 379.
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In Edge the court's reliance on Baker v. State 7 proves to be illogical in
law and reason. The continued rejection of the merger rule by the Georgia
Supreme Court does not serve the purposes of the felony murder rule,
namely to deter accidental killings during the commission of a felony. For
some unknown reasons, the supreme court is unwilling to alter its position and limit the felony murder doctrine.
Georgia's handling of the felony murder rule and the merger doctrine
shows no sign of changing. Edge provided hope for change; however, more
recent cases indicate that the hope may be fleeting. In Edge, the court
bypassed an opportunity to limit the felony murder rule by applying the
merger rule.8 8 More recently in Battles v. State,89 the Supreme Court of
Georgia rejected the opportunity to adopt the merger rule.' 0 Limitation in
Georgia is unlikely to come from statutory construction because the Georgia statute is broad and includes all felonies.1 Only in a few jurisdictions
have the courts completely abolished the felony murder rule.'2 Thus, the
vast majority of the states continue to adhere to some form of felony
murder rule, albeit limited.' 3 Georgia, on the other hand, is one of the few
states that does not limit the felony murder rule by statute.9 Edge is a
welcomed move toward the limitation of the rule. However, one must not
expect Georgia to adopt the merger rule; and certainly one should not
count on the abolishment of the felony murder rule. As for the rest of the
country, many states limit the felony murder rule considerably." However, expect the felony murder doctrine to survive far into the future."
IV. CONCLUSION
In Edge the court adopted a modified version of the merger rule. Specifically, the court held that when a jury finds voluntary manslaughter, it
could not find felony murder based upon the same underlying aggravated

87. 236 Ga. 754, 225 S.E.2d 269.
88. 261 Ga. at 866, 414 S.E.2d at 465.
89. 262 Ga. 415, 420 S.E.2d 303 (1992); See also Witherspoon v. State, 262 Ga. 2, 412
S.E.2d 829 (1992) when the Supreme Court of Georgia again refused to adopt the merger
rule.
90. 262 Ga. at 417,,420 S.E.2d at 305.
91. -CLEARY, supra note 23, at 251.
92. In People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 328-29 (Mich. 1980), the Supreme Court of

Michigan did away with the felony murder doctrine. In its opinion, the court cited to other
jurisdictions, including Kentucky, Hawaii, and Ohio, as having abolished the felony murder
rule. Id. at 314-15.
93. 2 LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 50,
94. CLEARY, supra note 23, at 251.
95.

2 LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 49,

96. Id.

§ 7.5(h).
§

7.5(h).
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assault' If the true purpose of the felony murder rule is to deter felons
from acting negligently during the commission of a felony, then this purpose is in no way served when a person deliberately intends to commit an
aggravated assault upon another. 8
MARK KENNETH DELEGAL

97. 261 Ga. at 865, 414 S.E.2d at 464.
98. CLEARY, supra note 23, at 252-53. Recently, the Georgia Supreme Court appears to
be stepping back from the decision in Edge. In Staart v. State, No. 592G127 (Feb. 25, 1993),
the court, in 4-3 decision, determined that the fact that the jury asks questions about what
constituted serious provocation as an indication that the jury properly considers voluntary
manslaughter before returning a verdict of felony murder.
Furthermore, in Head v. State, No. 592A1242 (Feb. 25, 1993), the court found that the
Edge sequential charge problem was not present in a malice murder case. Justice Willis B.
Hunt, Jr., the author of Edge, in a concurring opinion, suggests changes to correct the
problems the court indentified with the sequential charge in Edge.
This unfortunate softening on the decision in Edge, will no doubt continue to deprive
defendants of a fair trial, and continue to cause confusion in the minds of the jury when
considering changes on voluntary manslaughter and felony murder sequentially.

